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Quantum key distribution (QKD) offers the promise of absolutely secure communications. How-
ever, proofs of absolute security often assume perfect implementation from theory to experiment.
Thus, existing systems may be prone to insidious side-channel attacks that rely on flaws in experi-
mental implementation. Here we replace all real channels with virtual channels in a QKD protocol,
making the relevant detectors and settings inside private spaces inaccessible while simultaneously
acting as a Hilbert space filter to eliminate side-channel attacks. By using a quantum memory
we find that we are able to bound the secret-key rate below by the entanglement-distillation rate
computed over the distributed states.
PACS numbers: 03.65.Ud,03.67.Dd,42.50.-p
In 1982 Richard Feynman conjectured the use of quan-
tum systems as a technological platform for solving diffi-
cult calculations in physics. Eventually this insight lead
to the field of quantum information processing. As part
of the field’s growth, it has partly diverged into the two
main application domains: computation and communi-
cations, though much fundamental and technical overlap
still exists. Interestingly, the key application that has
started to mature and is now commercially available is
quantum cryptography, or more precisely quantum key
distribution (QKD) which has quickly moved from the
purely theoretical [1–4] to a practical technology [5–9].
How can we explain the impressive industrial uptake
of quantum cryptography and its ultimate aim to take
over classical systems? The answer lies in the claim of
“absolute security” [10]. Unfortunately, while the idea
is very compelling, subtle details in implementation may
introduce flaws that could, potentially, be open to attack.
Specifically, attacks from so called “side channels” rep-
resent one of the most elusive threats in practical quan-
tum cryptography, because a system could be vulnerable
to side-channel attacks even if it is unbreakable in the-
ory [11, 12]. In fact, the recent approach of “device-
independent QKD” [13] makes important advances in
handling imperfect implementations, and can even be
made by untrusted parties, but does not directly address
all possible side-channel attacks, where, for example, de-
tectors may directly receive external probing aimed at
seeding or gleaning their readout.
In principle side-channel attacks affect both classical
and quantum cryptography, but could be especially dev-
astating for quantum cryptography, precisely because
of the proclaimed absolute security “guarantee”. The
threat from such attacks has been demonstrated in both
lab and installed field settings [12]. Thus, while practi-
cal QKD systems have been fighting a trade-off between
distance and key generation rate, they are still facing the
fundamental problem of guaranteed security, choosing to
rely on theoretical promises of absolute security without
having any way of authenticating them in practice.
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FIG. 1: Private space to private space. The UTP acts as a
correlator.
Private spaces: general model
Let us consider the scenario of Fig. 1. Two authenti-
cated parties, Alice and Bob, control two private spaces,
A and B, respectively. Conventionally, these spaces are
assumed completely inaccessible from the outside, i.e.,
no illegitimate system may enter A or B. For this reason
every kind of side-channel attack upon the private spaces
is assumed excluded. In practice, however, any port can
allow a side-channel to enter possibly probing any de-
tector, state-generation or detector settings. To prevent
or overcome such attacks, the QKD system must effec-
tively isolate its private spaces: the private space must
not be directly involved in either state preparation (for
sending) or detection (of incoming states). To overcome
such probing side-channel attacks, we propose perform-
ing state-generation by collapse of a bipartite entangled
state, so that any probe from outside is perfectly isolated
from the state-generation “machinery” (see Supplemen-
tary Material for an extended discussion). Thus, in a
manner akin to teleportation, we replace all real chan-
nels with virtual channels. This allows us to physically
(and “topologically”) separate all detectors and settings
within the private space from external probing, while also
acting as a Hilbert space filter [14] against any side chan-
nel.
Within its own private space, each party (Alice or
2Bob) has a bipartite state ρ which entangles two systems:
{A,A′} for Alice, and {B,B′} for Bob. Systems {A,B}
are kept within the private spaces, while systems {A′, B′}
are sent to an untrusted third party (UTP), whose task
is to perform a quantum measurement and communicate
the corresponding result. This untrusted LOCC then al-
lows the creation of correlations between the private sys-
tems {A,B} that Alice and Bob can exploit to generate
a secret-key. In its simplest form an ideal side-channel
free QKD scheme reduces to an entanglement swapping
setup [15], with the dual teleportation channel acting as
an ideal Hilbert space filter. What is unique about our
protocol is the ability to completely protect private space
settings and detectors from probing side-channel attacks.
In the worst case scenario, the UTP must be identified
with Eve herself, whose aim is to eavesdrop the key, or
even prevent Alice and Bob from generating the key (i.e.,
a denial of service). In the most general case, Eve applies
a quantum instrument T = {Tl}
lmax
l=1 to the incoming sys-
tems {A′, B′}. This is a quantum operation with both
classical and quantum outputs. For each classical out-
come l, there is a corresponding completely positive (CP)
map Tl applied to the systems {A
′, B′} [16]. This means
that the global input state ρAA′ ⊗ ρBB′ is transformed
into the conditional output state
ρABE(l) ≡
1
p(l)
(IA ⊗ IB ⊗ Tl)(ρAA′ ⊗ ρBB′), (1)
where E represents an output quantum system in the
hands of Eve, while IA ⊗ IB is the identity channel act-
ing on the private systems {A,B}. Cleary each outcome l
will be found with some probability p(l), depending both
on Tl and the input state. As a consequence the classical
output of T can be simply represented by the stochas-
tic variable L ≡ {l, p(l)}. The quantum output of T is
represented by the system E which is correlated with the
private systems {A,B} via the conditional state ρABE|L
specified by Eq. (1). E is the system that Eve will use
for eavesdropping. For instance, most generally Eve can
store all the output systems E (generated in many in-
dependent rounds of the protocol) into a big quantum
memory. Then, she can detect the whole memory using
an optimal quantum measurement (corresponding to a
collective attack).
According to the agreed protocol, the UTP must send
a classical communication (CC) to both Alice and Bob
in order to “activate” the correlations. Here, Eve has
another weapon in her hands, i.e., tampering with the
classical outcomes. In order to decrease the correlations
between the honest parties, Eve may process the output
stochastic variable L via a classical channel
p(l′|l) : L→ L′, (2)
and then communicate the fake variable L′ = {l′, p(l′)}
to Alice and Bob, where
p(l′) =
∑
l
p(l′, l), p(l′, l) = p(l′|l)p(l). (3)
This process projects the private systems {A,B} onto
the conditional state
ρAB|L′ = TrE
(
ρABE|L′
)
, (4)
where
ρABE(l
′) ≡
1
p(l′)
∑
l
p(l′, l)ρABE(l) =
∑
l
p(l|l′)ρABE(l).
(5)
Notice that, if L′ is completely unrelated to L, then
Eve realizes a denial of service, being the communica-
tion of the fake variable equivalent to tracing over sys-
tems {A′, B′}. In other words, for p(l′, l) = p(l′)p(l), we
have ρAB|L′ = ρA ⊗ ρB, where ρA ≡ TrA′ (ρAA′) and
ρB ≡ TrB′ (ρBB′).
Secret-key rate: General analysis
After M rounds of the protocol, Alice and Bob will
share M copies (ρAB|L′)
⊗M . Note that, in general, Al-
ice and Bob do not know anything about the physical
process within the UTP, i.e., they do not know the cou-
ple {T, L → L′}. For this reason, what they actually
get are M copies of an unknown state ρ?AB plus classi-
cal information L′. However, by measuring a suitable
number M ′ of these copies, they are able to deduce the
explicit form of the conditional state ρAB|L′ for the re-
maining N = M −M ′ copies (here M, M ′ and N are
large numbers). Then, by applying local measurements,
Alice on her private systems and Bob on his, they are
able to extract two correlated classical variables, X and
Y . Finally, from these variables, they can derive a shared
secret key via the classical techniques of error correction
(EC) and privacy amplification (PA). These procedures
can be implemented using one-way classical communica-
tions between these two parties.
Let us bound the secret-key rate of the protocol. For
simplicity we omit here the conditioning on L′, so that
Eq. (4) simply becomes ρAB = TrE (ρABE). It is un-
derstood that the final result must be averaged over
L′. Independently from its generation, the (generally)
mixed state ρAB can be purified in a pure state ΦABe =
|Φ〉 〈Φ|ABe by introducing a suitable system “e” to be as-
signed to Eve (this is generally larger than the E system
considered before). After this purification, the scenario
is the one depicted in Fig. 2. Here, for every bipartition
of the systems, {AB, e}, {Ae,B}, or {Be,A}, the cor-
responding reduced states have the same von Neumann
entropy. In particular, we have S(ρAB) = S(ρe).
Now suppose that Alice performs a POVM MA =
{Aˆ(x)} on her system A with classical outcome x. This
measurement projects ΦABe onto the conditional state
ΦBe(x) =
1
p(x)
TrA
[
Aˆ(x)ΦABeAˆ(x)
†
]
, (6)
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FIG. 2: Purified scenario.
where
p(x) = TrABe
[
Aˆ(x)ΦABeAˆ(x)
†
]
. (7)
Thus Alice encodes the stochastic variable X = {x, p(x)}
in the nonlocal ensemble EBe ≡ {ΦBe(x), p(x)}. Given
the conditional state ΦBe|X of Eq. (6), Bob and Eve can
only access their local states, respectively given by
ρB(x) = Tre [ΦBe(x)] , ρe(x) = TrB [ΦBe(x)] . (8)
Thus, on his side, Bob has the ensemble EB ≡
{ρB(x), p(x)}, whose measurement estimates Alice’s vari-
able X . Assuming that Bob has a quantum memory,
he can collect all the private systems B associated to
the N rounds of the protocol. Then, asymptotically for
N →∞, Bob can reach the Holevo bound [17]
I(X : B) = S(ρB)−
∑
x
p(x)S[ρB(x)]. (9)
At the same time, Eve’s information is bounded by
I(X : e) = S(ρe)−
∑
x
p(x)S[ρe(x)]. (10)
Assuming one-way CCs from Alice to Bob (for imple-
menting EC and PA), we can write the secret-key rate as
a difference of Holevo informations [18], i.e.,
R = I(X : B)− I(X : e). (11)
If we now assume that Alice’s POVM is rank one,
then the conditional state ΦBe|X is pure and, therefore,
ρB|X and ρe|X have the same entropy, i.e., S[ρB(x)] =
S[ρe(x)]. As a consequence, we can write
R = S(ρB)− S(ρe) = S(ρB)− S(ρAB) = I(A〉B), (12)
where I(A〉B) is the coherent information between Alice
and Bob. Thus the secret-key rate is lower-bounded by
the entanglement-distillation rate.
Secret-key rate: Detailed analysis
Here we make a more detailed analysis which is more
closely connected to the scenario of Fig. 1. In fact, the
rate R of Eq. (12) comes from the general configuration
of Fig. 2, which is independent from the actual process
generating the final state of Alice and Bob. If we explic-
itly consider the peculiarities of the scheme of Fig. 1, then
we could achieve a larger rate R∗ ≥ R. This new rate can
be achieved if Alice and Bob have some knowledge of the
classical unreliability of the UTP, i.e., of the amount of
information which is “absorbed” by the classical channel
L → L′. Thus, if Eve tries to tamper with the overall
security by employing fake CCs, then Alice and Bob can
potentially extract a secret-key with rate larger than the
entanglement-distillation rate.
In this section, we take the different conditionings (by
L and L′) explicitly into account. After the CC of L′ =
{l′, p(l′)}, Alice and Bob possess the conditional state
ρAB(l
′) of Eq. (4). Let us assume that Alice performs
a POVM MA = {Aˆ(x)} on her system A with classical
outcome x. This generates the doubly-conditional state
ρB(x, l
′) =
1
p(x|l′)
TrA
[
Aˆ(x)ρAB(l
′)Aˆ(x)†
]
, (13)
where
p(x|l′) = TrAB
[
Aˆ(x)ρAB(l
′)Aˆ(x)†
]
. (14)
Averaging over the CCs, the output of Alice’s measure-
ment is the unconditional variable X = {x, p(x)}, where
p(x) =
∑
l′
p(x|l′)p(l′) = TrA
[
Aˆ(x)ρAAˆ(x)
†
]
. (15)
This is the secret variable to be estimated by Bob. In his
private system B, Bob has the ensemble
EB = {p(x, l
′), ρB(x, l
′)}, (16)
where p(x, l′) = p(x|l′)p(l′). Clearly, this ensemble de-
pends on both X and L′. Exploiting his knowledge of
L′, Bob applies a conditional measurementMB|L′ to his
system B which estimates the value x encoded by Al-
ice. Asymptotically (i.e., for N →∞), using a quantum
memory and averaging over the CCs (i.e., over L′), Bob
can reach the conditional Holevo information [19]
I(X : B|L′) =
∑
l′
p(l′) I(X : B|L′ = l′). (17)
For Eve we have to consider the different conditioning
given by L. Thus, the conditional state that Eve shares
with Alice is
ρAE|L = TrB
(
ρABE|L
)
, (18)
which becomes ρE|XL after Alice’s projection. Explicitly
this state is given by
ρE(x, l) =
1
p(x|l)
TrA
[
Aˆ(x)ρAE(l)Aˆ(x)
†
]
, (19)
4where
p(x|l) = TrAB
[
Aˆ(x)ρAE(l)Aˆ(x)
†
]
. (20)
Thus, Eve has the ensemble
EE = {p(x, l), ρE(x, l)}, (21)
where p(x, l) = p(x|l)p(l). Asymptotically, Eve can
eavesdrop I(X : E|L) bits per copy [20].
As a result, we can write the secret-key rate
R∗ = I(X : B|L′)− I(X : E|L). (22)
This quantity can be rewritten as R∗ = R′ +∆, where
R′ ≡ I(X : B|L′)− I(X : E|L′), (23)
and ∆ ≡ I(X : E|L′) − I(X : E|L), quantifies the in-
formation which is “absorbed” by the classical channel
L → L′. We call ∆ the “classical cheating” by Eve.
Clearly, we have ∆ = 0 for L′ = L. R′ is the “apparent
rate”, which refers to the apparent scenario where Alice,
Bob and Eve are all subject to the same conditioning L′.
In other words, R′ is computed assuming the total state
ρABE|L′ , which is then projected onto ρBE|XL′ by Alice’s
measurement (see Fig. 3).
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FIG. 3: Conditional state ρABE|L′ projected onto ρBE|XL′ .
We can now easily prove that the secret-key rate is
larger than the entanglement-distillation rate. We have
the following result (see Supplementary Material for the
proof).
Theorem. Suppose that Eve measures the incoming
systems but cheats on the results using a classical channel
L→ L′. Then, Alice and Bob’s secret-key rate satisfies
R∗ ≥ I(A〉B|L′) + ∆, (24)
where I(A〉B|L′) is the coherent information conditioned
to Eve’s fake variable L′, and ∆ is the classical cheating.
Our analysis leaves an intriguing open question. It
would be wonderful to provide an explicit example where
simultaneously ∆ > 0 and I(A〉B|L′) = 0, so that
R∗ > 0. This would imply secret-key distillation with-
out entanglement distillation. More generally, we cannot
exclude the possibility that R∗ > I(A〉B|L′) by using
POVMs which are not rank one.
Conclusion
We have shown that virtual channels may replace real
channels in the QKD setting so as to remove any pos-
sibility of side-channel attacks. In its simplest setting,
our QKD protocol corresponds to an entanglement swap-
ping experiment, where the dual teleportation channels
act as ideal Hilbert space filters to wipe out side-channel
attacks. The authenticated users’ private spaces are de-
signed so that any incoming quantum signal is topologi-
cally excluded from access to detectors, detector settings
or state-generation settings, thus side-channel probing
attacks of the private spaces are eliminated. Finally, an
external untrusted party performs a suitable LOCC (such
as a Bell-state measurement) to create correlations nec-
essary for shared key generation.
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Supplementary Material
IN DEFENSE OF PRIVATE SPACES
In quantum cryptography unconditional security
proofs are derived under the assumption that Alice’s and
Bob’s apparata (private spaces) are completely inacces-
sible by an eavesdropper who, therefore, can only at-
tack the signal systems which are transmitted through
the quantum communication channel connecting the two
parties. Under this assumption, secret-key rates and se-
curity thresholds are derived in both discrete and contin-
uous variable quantum key distribution.
One potential loophole in the security proofs is related
to how a theoretical protocol is actually implemented ex-
perimentally. Any redundant information encoded in ex-
tra degrees of freedom or extra Hilbert space dimensions
outside the theoretical prescription can allow for so-called
side-channel attacks. By their nature, such attacks may
be of classical or quantum degrees of freedom and are in-
sidious because even quantifying their threat appears to
involve understanding what have been called unknown
unknowns about the vulnerability of the experimental
set-up.
Progress has been made on eliminating side-channel at-
tacks in the quantum communication channels between
private spaces, but this leaves open potential attacks on
the private spaces through their quantum communication
ports. Let us therefore take a step back and consider
private spaces in more detail: What goes on in Alice’s
and Bob’s private spaces involves a significant amount of
classical information processing; at the very least the key
itself will be generated and stored as classical informa-
tion. Now with virtually any technology we have today
5classical information is stored, processed and transmitted
in a highly redundant fashion (many electrons are used
to charge a capacitor to represent a bit value, or many
electrons must pass through the base junction of a tran-
sistor to effect a logical switching operation, tapping on
a keyboard produces sound waves and electromagnetic
signals in addition to the ‘legitimate’ electrical signals in
the wires, etc). In principle any of this redundant infor-
mation may leak out of the private space through a “par-
asite” channel. An eavesdropper might therefore ignore
the quantum communication channel and directly attack
Alice’s and Bob’s apparata by exploiting the presence of
parasite channels: this is also a “side-channel attack”.
The implicit assumption in quantum cryptography is
that we could always improve technology in such a way
that Alice’s and Bob’s private spaces are not affected by
the presence of parasite channels, so that the legitimate
participants do indeed have access to absolutely private
spaces. (For instance, Alice and Bob could simulate the
classical information processing on a quantum computer.
A hacked operating system on such a machine could be
tested for by randomly running subroutines that confirm
that coherence is preserved and that no information is
copied out to where it can be stored or transmitted by a
trojan program — see also Ref. [21].)
However, even if you rely on a perfect isolation tech-
nology, there remains a potential chink in this armor,
which is the quantum communication port used either to
transmit a quantum state out of your private space or to
accept a quantum state for detection into it.
If you open a communication port for quantum states
to enter or leave you must explicitly deal with side chan-
nels which can be probing these links to your private
space. Eve can potentially send trojan systems through
Alice’s and Bob’s communication ports and detect their
reflection to infer both state preparation and measure-
ment settings. As an example, in the standard BB84
protocol, Eve can irradiate Alice’s apparatus by using
optical modes at slightly different frequencies. Then,
from reflection, Eve can infer the polarization chosen in
each round of the protocol. Thanks to this information,
Eve can measure each signal system in the correct basis.
Another example regards the so-called plug-and-play sys-
tems, where trojan systems can be reflected together with
signal systems, as discussed in Ref. [10].
Our paper shows how to overcome the problem of the
open quantum communication ports, therefore making
feasible the notion of absolutely private spaces. Note
that this problem is not addressed by current device-
independent quantum cryptography, where such attacks
on the private space ports are simply considered illegiti-
mate as they violate the strong private space assumption.
The key point of our scheme is that detectors are no
longer “in line” with the quantum communication port
of the private space. For this reason, it is not possible
for an external party to probe the port and obtain detec-
tor settings or readouts from the processing of parasite
systems. In order to explain this key feature in detail,
we analyze the problem of the quantum communication
ports by comparing standard protocols with our scheme.
In Fig. 4, we depict a general prepare-and-measure pro-
tocol, where Alice’s variable X is encoded in a quantum
state ρ(X) by modulation. Bob’s variable Y is the out-
put of a quantum measurement. Here, Eve can attack
the quantum communication ports by using two trojan
systems e and f . By means of e, Eve can retrieve in-
formation about the state preparation X → ρ(X). By
means of f , she can retrieve information about the mea-
surement apparatus of Bob and, therefore, about Y .
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FIG. 4: Port attack in a prepare and measure protocol.
In Fig. 5, we depict a general entanglement-based pro-
tocol, where an untrusted party (Eve) distributes entan-
glement between two parties. This is done by distributing
an entangled state ρ = ρAB, where system A is sent to
Alice and system B is sent to Bob. Alice and Bob can
perform entanglement distillation and measure the out-
put distilled systems to derive two correlated classical
variables, X and Y , respectively. In this scenario, Eve
can decide not to attack the source ρ but directly the two
quantum communication ports of Alice and Bob. Eve can
probe these ports by using two trojan systems e and f ,
which can retrieve information about Alice’s and Bob’s
distilling and detecting apparata. As a result, Eve can
infer information about X and Y .
In Fig. 6, we depict our protocol where an untrusted
party (Eve) represents an entanglement swapper between
Alice and Bob. This is generally done by measuring two
public systems, A′ and B′, received from Alice and Bob,
processing the outcome of the measurement, and clas-
sically communicating the processed data back to Alice
and Bob. As a result the two private systems, A and
B, become correlated, so that Alice and Bob can extract
two correlated classical variables, X and Y , by applying
suitable measurements. In particular, if Alice and Bob
can access quantum memories, then they can extract a
secret key at a rate which is at least equal to the coher-
ent information between A and B. Eve can attempt a
side-channel attack against the two ports by sending two
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FIG. 5: Port attack in an entanglement-based protocol.
trojan systems e and f . In this case, however, the appa-
rata which detect the two private systems A and B are
inaccessible to Eve. By exploiting reflections from the
ports, Eve can only retrieve information regarding the
reduced states ρA′ and ρB′ of the two public systems A
′
and B′. However, these reduced states contain no useful
information about the private system A or B or Alice’s
or Bob’s detector settings or outputs.
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FIG. 6: Port attack in our scheme.
To understand better how the full isolation of the pri-
vate systems might be achieved, we may consider the
procedure depicted in Fig. 7. It is explained for Alice’s
private space, but steps are identical for Bob.
In the first step (a), Alice’s port is closed and she pre-
pares an entangled state ρ = ρAA′ where system A is
directed towards a quantum memory (QM), while sys-
tem A′ is directed towards a delay line (DL). In step (b),
once system A is stored in the memory and while system
A′ is trapped in the delay line, a shutter is used to fully
separate the delay line from the rest of Alice’s appara-
tus. Note that a virtual channel between A and A′ has
been created. In step (c), Alice’s quantum communica-
tion port is opened and system A′ is transmitted to Eve.
During this stage, trojan systems may enter the port but
no detector is in line with the port. In step (d), the port
is closed with the private system A kept in the mem-
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FIG. 7: Possible procedure for the full isolation of the private
systems. See text for explanations.
ory. The previous steps (a)-(d) are repeated many times,
so that Alice collects many private systems in her quan-
tum memory. We therefore reach step (e) of the figure.
Finally, once Alice has received all the classical commu-
nications, she applies a collective quantum measurement
on her quantum memory to retrieve the classical variable
X . This measurement can include or be anticipated by
an entanglement distillation.
NOTATION AND BASIC FORMULAS
In part of the derivation we adopt the enlarged Hilbert
space (EHS) representation, where stochastic classical
variables are embedded in quantum systems. Consider a
stochastic variable X = {x, p(x)} which is encoded into
7an ensemble of states of some quantum system A, i.e.,
EA = {p(x), ρA(x)}. (25)
This ensemble may be equivalently represented by the
classical-quantum (CQ) state
ρXA =
∑
x
p(x) |x〉 〈x|
X
⊗ ρA(x), (26)
where the stochastic variable X is embedded into the
dummy quantum system X, by using an orthonormal
basis {|x〉} in the Hilbert space HX of X. We denote
by ρA(x) the state of a system A which is conditioned
by the value x of a stochastic variable X . The notation
ρA|X refers to the conditional state ρA(x) where x is not
specified. Clearly, we have
ρA =
∑
x
p(x)ρA(x). (27)
Given a quantum system A in a state ρA, its von Neu-
mann entropy S(ρA) is also denoted by H(A). Given a
quantum system X, embedding the stochastic variable
X , its quantum entropy H(X) is just the Shannon en-
tropy H(X). Given two quantum systems, A and B, we
denote by I(A : B) their quantum mutual information.
This is defined by
I(A : B) = H(B)−H(B|A), (28)
whereH(B|A) = H(AB)−H(A) is the conditional quan-
tum entropy. Note that H(B|A) can be negative and it
is related to the coherent information by the relation
I(A〉B) = −H(B|A). (29)
For A = X, the quantum mutual information I(A : X),
which is computed over the CQ-state of Eq. (26), corre-
sponds to the Holevo information I(A : X), computed
over the ensemble of Eq. (25). For A = X and B = Y,
embedding two stochastic variables X and Y , I(X : Y)
is just the classical mutual information I(X : Y ). For
three quantum systems A, B, and C, we can consider
the conditional quantum mutual information
I(A : B|C) = H(AC)+H(BC)−H(ABC)−H(C), (30)
which is ≥ 0 as a consequence of the strong subadditivity
of the von Neumann entropy. For a classically correlated
system C = X, we have a probabilistic average over mu-
tual informations, i.e.,
I(A : B|X) = I(A : B|X) ≡
∑
x
p(x) I(A : B|X = x).
(31)
List of other useful elements:
• Given a tripartite quantum system ABC, we can
use the “chain rule”
I(A : BC) = I(A : B) + I(A : C|B). (32)
• Invariance of the Holevo information under addi-
tion of classical channels, i.e., for a classical chan-
nel
p(y|x) : X → Y, (33)
we have
I(A : X) = I(A : XY ). (34)
• Given a Markov chain X → Y → Z, the classi-
cal mutual information decreases under condition-
ing [22], i.e.,
I(X : Y |Z) ≤ I(X : Y ). (35)
Notice that, for three general stochastic variables,
we have I(X : Y |Z) R I(X : Y ), so that the so-
called “interaction information”
I(X : Y : Z) ≡ I(X : Y |Z)− I(X : Y ), (36)
can be positive, negative or zero.
• Data processing inequality. For a Markov chain
X → Y → Z, we have
H(X) ≥ I(X : Y ) ≥ I(X : Z). (37)
PROOF OF THE THEOREM
Let us purify the mixed state ρABE|L′ into the pure
state ΦABEE˜|L′ = |Φ〉 〈Φ|ABEE˜|L′ by introducing an an-
cillary system E˜ which is assumed to be in Eve’s hands
(so that Eve’s global system consists of EE˜). This sce-
nario is depicted in Fig. 8.
Alice BobEve
A E B
Private SpacePrivate Space
L’ L’
E~
X
FIG. 8: Purification. Conditional state ΦABEE˜|L′ projected
onto ΦBEE˜|XL′ .
Thus, for the total state ρABE|L′ , we have
ρABE(l
′) = TrE˜ [ΦABEE˜(l
′)] . (38)
For the conditional state ρBE|XL′ , generated by the mea-
surement, we can write
ρBE(x, l
′) =
1
p(x|l′)
TrA
[
Aˆ(x)ρABE(l
′)Aˆ(x)†
]
=
1
p(x|l′)
TrAE˜
[
Aˆ(x)ΦABEE˜(l
′)Aˆ(x)†
]
= TrE˜ [ΦBEE˜(x, l
′)] , (39)
8where
ΦBEE˜(x, l
′) ≡
1
p(x|l′)
TrA
[
Aˆ(x)ΦABEE˜(l
′)Aˆ(x)†
]
,
(40)
represents the conditional state ΦBEE˜|XL′ which is gener-
ated by the measurement in the purified scenario. Clearly
if we discard X , we get the reduced state
ΦBEE˜|L′ ≡
〈
ΦBEE˜|XL′
〉
X
= TrA
[
ΦABEE˜|L′
]
. (41)
Because of Eq. (39), the conditional state ΦBEE˜|XL′ can
be used to compute R′ via
R′ ≡ I(X : B|L′)ρ − I(X : E|L
′)ρ
= I(X : B|L′)Φ − I(X : E|L
′)Φ, (42)
where ρ = ρBE|XL′ and Φ = ΦBEE˜|XL′ (the computation
is exactly the same up to a trace over E˜). In the EHS
representation, the conditional state ΦBEE˜|XL′ becomes
Ψ
XL′BEE˜ =
∑
x,l′
p(x, l′) |x〉 〈x|
X
⊗|l′〉 〈l′|
L′
⊗ΦBEE˜(x, l
′).
(43)
Thus, we can also set
R′ = I(X : B|L′)Ψ − I(X : E|L
′)Ψ, (44)
where Ψ = Ψ
XL
′BEE˜ . From the chain rule we have
I(X : EE˜|L′)Ψ = I(X : E|L
′)Ψ + I(X : E˜|EL
′)Ψ
= I(X : E|L′)Ψ + γ, (45)
where γ ≡ I(X : E˜|EL′)Ψ ≥ 0 is the information contri-
bution due to the purification [23]. In other words, the
(conditional) Holevo information can only increase with
the purification, i.e.,
I(X : EE˜|L′) = I(X : E|L′) + γ ≥ I(X : E|L′). (46)
As a consequence, we have R′ = R′′ + γ, where
R′′ ≡ I(X : B|L′)Φ − I(X : EE˜|L
′)Φ. (47)
In terms of conditional entropies, we have
R′′ =H(B|L′)Φ −H(B|XL
′)Φ
− [H(EE˜|L′)Φ −H(EE˜|XL
′)Φ]. (48)
Here H(EE˜|L′) is computed over Φ = ΦBEE˜|XL′ dis-
carding X and B, i.e., over the reduced state
ΦEE|L′ = TrAB
[
ΦABEE˜|L′
]
. (49)
Now since ΦABEE˜|L′ is pure, we have H(EE˜|L
′) =
H(AB|L′), where H(AB|L′) can be computed over
ρAB|L′ = TrEE˜ [ΦABEE˜|L′ ]. Clearly, also H(B|L
′)Φ can
be computed over ρAB|L′ . As a consequence we can rec-
ognize in Eq. (48) the conditional coherent information
I(A〉B|L′) = H(B|L′)−H(AB|L′),
associated with Alice and Bob’s conditional state ρAB|L′ .
Thus, we can set
R′′ = I(A〉B|L′) + [H(EE˜|XL′)Φ −H(B|XL
′)Φ]. (50)
Here, we can assume that Alice’s measurement is a rank
one POVM. As a result, Φ = ΦBEE˜|XL′ is also a pure
state, and we can set H(EE˜|XL′)Φ = H(B|XL
′)Φ, so
that R′′ = I(A〉B|L′). Finally, we can write
R∗ = R′′ + γ +∆
= I(A〉B|L′) + γ +∆
≥ I(A〉B|L′) + ∆, (51)
where we have used γ ≥ 0 from its definition.
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